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True contextuality in a Psychophysical Experiment
Víctor H. Cervantes and Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov
Abstract
Recent crowdsourcing experiments have shown that true contextuality of the kind found in
quantum mechanics can also be present in human behavior. In these experiments simple hu-
man choices were aggregated over large numbers of respondents, with each respondent dealing
with a single context (set of questions asked). In this paper we present experimental evidence
of contextuality in individual human behavior, in a psychophysical experiment with repeated
presentations of visual stimuli in randomly varying conteXts (arrangements of stimuli). The
analysis is based on the Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) theory whose relevant aspects are re-
viewed in the paper. CbD allows one to detect contextuality in the presence of direct influences,
i.e., when responses to the same stimuli have different distributions in different contexts. The
experiment presented is also the first one in which contextuality is demonstrated for responses
that are not dichotomous, with five options to choose among. CbD requires that random vari-
ables representing such responses be dichotomized before they are subjected to contextuality
analysis. A theorem says that a system consisting of all possible dichotomizations of responses
has to be contextual if these responses violate a certain condition, called nominal dominance.
In our experiment nominal dominance was violated in all data sets, with very high statistical
reliability established by bootstrapping.
KEYWORDS: contextuality, inconsistent connectedness, nominal dominance, psychophysics.
Contextuality (or lack thereof) is a characteristic of a system of random variables. A set of random
variables forms a system if each random variable Rcq in it is uniquely identified by its content q and
its context c. The content q is that which the random variable measures or responds to, while the
context c is a complex of recorded conditions under which this random variable is observed. As an
example, the following set of random variables,
R11 R
1
2 R
1
4 c = 1
R22 R
2
3 c = 2
R31 R
3
2 R
3
3 c = 3
q = 1 q = 2 q = 3 q = 4 system E
, (1)
forms a system with three contexts and four contents.
To prevent possible misreadings, we will follow the convention adopted in Dzhafarov and Kujala
(2016a) and capitalize the distinguishing letters in the words “conteNt” and “conteXt.”
The conteNts could be, e.g., four stimuli (say, questions or light flashes), and conteXts be defined
by which two or three of them are presented in a single trial, say, in a fixed succession. Thus, in
conteXt c = 1, three stimuli (q = 1, q = 2, and q = 4) are presented, and each of them is being
responded to in accordance with some instructions. Depending on the arrangements, a response
to a given stimulus can be given immediately after it is presented or after all three of them are
presented — such experimental details are immaterial for contextuality analysis insofar as responses
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2and stimuli are in a one-to-one correspondence. The responses in the conteXt c = 1 are the random
variables R11, R12, R14 shown in the first row of (1). They may be binary (e.g., Yes/No, or I saw it/I
did not see it), or they can be multi-valued ones (e.g., each stimulus may have a name, and the task
may be to identify which stimulus was shown). The difference between binary and more-than-binary
responses plays a central role in the present paper.
Let us explain the intuition behind the notion of contextuality using (1). The random variables
within a given conteXt are jointly distributed, and the marginal distribution of a given-conteNt
variable may depend on the conteXt in which it is recorded. Thus, the distributions of R22 and R32
may be different, so by knowing the distribution one can guess in which of the two conteXts, c = 2
or c = 3, the conteNt q = 2 is being responded to. This means that the effect of a conteXt upon
a distribution is information-carrying, i.e., it is a causal influence. We call such influences direct.
The terminology used in physics for direct influences is “signaling,” “disturbance,” “invasiveness,”
etc. (Cereceda, 2000; Leggett & Garg, 1985). In psychology we usually speak of “violations of
marginal selectivity” (Dzhafarov, 2003; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016b). If, e.g., the conteNts in (1)
are questions, and in each conteXt they are posed in a succession, in the order of their values
(q = 1, 2, 3, 4), then the response R22 to q = 2 in conteXt c = 2 may very well differ in distribution
from the response R32 to the same q = 2 in conteXt c = 3, because in the later case the respondent
could have been affected by the previously asked q = 1. The (dis)similarity of two conteNt-sharing
variables, such as R22 and R32, can be measured by how often their values could coincide had they
been jointly distributed (de facto, they are not, because they occur in mutually exclusive conteXts).
In other words, the similarity of R22 and R32 is measured by the maximal value of Pr
[
T 22 = T
3
2
]
among all jointly distributed pairs
{
T 22 , T
3
2
}
such that T 22 is distributed as R22, and T 32 as R32. Any
such a pair
{
T 22 , T
3
2
}
is called a coupling of R22 and R32, and the couplings with the maximal value
of Pr
[
T 22 = T
3
2
]
are called maximal. We can find maximal couplings for all other conteNt-sharing
pairs
{
Rcq, R
c′
q
}
. For some of them we may expect no distributional differences (in our example
with questions it could be, e.g., R11, R31, as in both these cases q = 1 is asked first), and then the
maximal value of Pr
[
T 22 = T
3
2
]
will be 1. This is the case of traditional interest in quantum physics.
However, generally, both in physics and psychology, differences in distributions of conteNt-sharing
random variables should be expected and taken into account. Direct influence is, of course, a form
of conteXt-dependence, but it is very different from what is considered contextuality in the proper
sense of the word. The latter is detected in the system by showing that the just mentioned maximal
couplings of the conteNt-sharing pairs are not compatible with the joint distributions of the random
variables within conteXts. In other words, a system is contextual if the joint distributions within
conteXts force the conteNt-sharing pairs across conteNts to be more dissimilar than they could be
if taken without the conteXts. While direct influences exerted by conteNts are causal (information-
carrying), true contextuality is of a correlational, non-causal nature.1 More rigorous definitions are
given below, in Section 1.
To provide historical perspective, contextuality (without using this term at first) was introduced
1To prevent objections, direct influences are defined in our theory as the differences in distributions, so one
cannot speak of “hidden” influences (Filk, 2015, 2016). Thus, if the variables in system E are binary, +1/ − 1,
and Pr
[
R11 = 1
]
= Pr
[
R31 = 1
]
= 0.5, one can imagine that “in reality” conteXt c = 3 somehow acts upon the
“potential values” of R31 reversing their signs, R
3
1 → −R31, without changing the distribution. However, this is not
considered a “direct influence,” because in the given system of random variables these unnoticeable changes do not
carry information. If one can actually observe the changes R31 → −R31, the system of random variables one deals
with changes dramatically, and the CbD analysis then changes accordingly (Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017;
Dzhafarov & Kon, 2018; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2018).
3in quantum physics by Bell (1964, 1966) and Kochen and Specker (1967). They demonstrated that
one could meaningfully address, using only observable measurements, the question famously dis-
cussed in Bohr’s (1935) critique of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935). The question is whether
all measurement outcomes in a system of measurements can be presented as being determined by
some “hidden” random variable in a conteXt-independent way, i.e., using conteXt-independent map-
pings from the values of this hidden variable into the values of the observed measurement outcomes.
With the work of Fine (1982a, b) and Suppes and Zanotti (1981), it became clear that contextuality
can also be formulated in terms of the (non)existence of certain joint distributions involving random
variables recorded in different conteXts. Although some researchers disagree (Griffiths, 2017), this
seems to have become a common way of understanding contextuality (Abramsky, Barbosa, Kishida,
Lal, & Mansfield, 2015; Abramsky, & Brandenburger, 2011; Araújo, Quintino, Budroni, Cunha, &
Cabello, 2013; Budroni, 2016; Cabello, 2013; Khrennikov, 2008; Klyachko, Can, Binicioglu, &
Shumovsky, 2008; Kurzynski, Ramanathan, & Kaszlikowski, 2012; Liang, Spekkens, & Wiseman,
2011; Ramanathan, Soeda, Kurzynski, & Kaszlikowski, 2012). Probabilistic underpinnings of this
understanding have been critically examined by Khrennikov (2000a, b; 2001) and Dzhafarov and
Kujala (2016a; 2017a). Irrespective of the debated issues and disagreements, however, contextuality
analysis has been moved from physics to probability theory, making it apparent that random vari-
ables in contextuality analysis need not represent quantum measurements, they can also be, e.g.,
responses of biological organisms to stimuli. However, the search for contextuality in psychology
was frustrated by the fact that all behavioral systems of random variables exhibit strong direct
influences, whereas the theory of contextuality in quantum mechanics, until recently, was only de-
veloped for consistently connected systems, those in which conteNt-sharing random variables have
identical distributions. When direct influences are taken into account, a large body of experimental
data collected in search of contextuality can be shown to exhibit no contextuality (Dzhafarov, &
Kujala, 2014; Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, & Jones, 2016; Dzhafarov, Zhang, & Kujala,
2015). Nevertheless two very recent series of experiments unequivocally demonstrate that behav-
ioral data (simple conjoint choices made by people) can be represented by contextual systems of
random variables (Basieva, Cervantes, Dzhafarov, & Khrennikov, in press; Cervantes & Dzhafarov,
2018). These experiments dealt with responses aggregated over large pools of people, with each
person making choices within a single conteXt.
This paper presents the first experimental evidence of contextuality in individual human behav-
ior. In the experiment presented below, each of the three participants made repeated choices in a
series of randomized conteXts. A similar experiment, with essentially the same stimuli and similar
instructions, has been conducted before, and analyzed in two different ways (Cervantes & Dzha-
farov, 2017a, b): both these analyses revealed no contextuality in the data. The main difference of
that experiment from the present one is that in the former all choices were binary, whereas in the
present experiment each choice was made among five options. This is an important difference in
the theory presented below.
1 Contextuality-by-Default Theory
1.1 Generalities
A system of random variables is defined as a set of double-indexed random variables
R = {Rcq : c ∈ C, q ∈ Q, q ≺ c} , (2)
4where C is a set of conteXts, Q is a set of conteNts, and q ≺ c (or c  q) is read “conteNt q is recorded
in conteXt c”.2 Examples of a conteNt q (the “thing” being measured or responded to) are particle’s
spin in a given direction in a Hilbert space, or a question asked of a person. Examples of a conteXt
c may be subsets of conteNts measured “together” (simultaneously or sequentially), or different
conditions associated with a given subset of conteNts (e.g., the order in which two fixed questions
are asked). The corresponding Rcq would then be the spin value (say, “up” or “down”) along axis q in
a given set c of measured properties, or the response (say, “yes” or “no”) to question q asked before
or after another question, q′, with c = (q′, q). As a random variable, Rcq is a measurable function
from a probability space (Xc, Ξc, pic) to a measurable space (Yq, Υq), with the usual meaning of the
components. The probability space
(
Yq, Υq, p
c
q
)
induced by this function is the distribution of Rcq.
The indices show that (Xc, Ξc, pic) is common to all Rcq within a conteXt c, i.e., all such Rcq are
jointly distributed, reflecting the fact that their realizations are empirically linked. Put differently,
for any c ∈ C, the set
Rc =
{
Rcq : q ∈ Q, q ≺ c
}
(3)
can be viewed as a random variable. It is a principle of CbD that any Rcq, Rc
′
q′ with c 6= c′ are
stochastically unrelated, i.e., (Xc, Ξc, pic) 6= (Xc′ , Ξc′ , pic′), reflecting the fact that conteXts are
mutually exclusive, so no pairing of the values of Rcq and Rc
′
q′ is defined. In particular, the variables
in
Rq =
{
Rcq : c ∈ C, q ≺ c
}
(4)
for a given q are not jointly distributed. However, the distributions of any Rcq, Rc
′
q in Rq always
share the same measurable space, (Yq, Υq), reflecting the fact that Rcq and Rc
′
q have the same conteNt
(i.e., they measure or respond to the same “thing”).
The next definition is a modification of the usual one (Thorisson, 2000), to better suit our
purposes. A (probabilistic) coupling of an indexed set of random variables {Vi}i∈I is an identically
indexed set of jointly distributed random variables {Wi}i∈I such that, for any subset I ′ ⊆ I, if the
elements of {Vi}i∈I′ are jointly distributed, then {Wi}i∈I′ dist= {Vi}i∈I′ (the same distribution). In
particular, a coupling of a system R in (2) is a set
S =
{
Scq : c ∈ C, q ∈ Q, q ≺ c
}
(5)
of jointly distributed random variables, such that, for all c ∈ C,
Rc =
{
Rcq : q ∈ Q, q ≺ c
} dist
=
{
Scq : q ∈ Q, q ≺ c
}
= Sc. (6)
Returning to our example (1), the following matrix of jointly distributed random variables (or
simply, the following random variable) E,
S11 S
1
2 S
1
4 c = 1
S22 S
2
3 c = 2
S31 S
3
2 S
3
3 c = 3
q = 1 q = 2 q = 3 q = 4 coupling E
, (7)
2Here and throughout, we conveniently confuse Rcq and
(
Rcq , c, q
)
, so that, e.g.,
{
Rcq , R
c
q′
}
consists of two random
variables even if Rcq ≡ Rcq′ , the same measurable function. Also, we follow the common tradition of conveniently
confusing functions Rcq with their values.
5is a coupling of E if Sc dist= Rc for c = 1, 2, 3.
Let Pmax be the following statement, well-defined (in the sense of being true or false) for any
two jointly distributed random variables A,B:
Pmax (A,B) = “Pr [A = B] is maximal possible, given the distributions of A and B.” (8)
If a coupling
{
Scq , S
c′
q
}
of two conteNt-sharing random variables Rcq and Rc
′
q satisfies this statement,
it is called a maximal coupling of Rcq and Rc
′
q . The system R is noncontextual if R has a coupling
S in which any
{
Scq , S
c′
q
}
is a maximal coupling of Rcq and Rc
′
q . Otherwise, if such a coupling S
does not exist, the system is contextual. Using our example in (7), system E is noncontextual if and
only if among all its couplings E one can find at least one in which all equalities S11 = S31 , S12 = S22 ,
S22 = S
3
2 , and S23 = S33 occur with the maximal probability allowed by their individual distributions.
Thus, if R11 and R31 are dichotomous, +1/− 1, with Pr
[
R11 = 1
]
= p and Pr
[
R31 = 1
]
= q, then the
maximal possible probability of S11 = S31 is 1−|p− q|. Obviously, any subsystem of a noncontextual
system (obtained by deleting some of the random variables) is noncontextual, or, equivalently, any
system with a contextual subsystem is contextual.
1.2 Dichotomous random variables
Most systems of traditional interest consist of dichotomous random variables. Among basic prop-
erties of such systems one should mention the following (Dzhafarov, 2017; Dzhafarov, Cervantes, &
Kujala, 2017; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2017a, b).
(P1) Adding to or removing from a system a deterministic random variable (attaining a single
value with probability 1), or a variable that does not share its conteXt or its conteNt with
other variables, does not change the system’s (non)contextuality (in fact, does not change the
degree of contextuality, but we do not discuss this notion here).
(P2) A set of conteNt-sharing random variables Rq =
{
Rcq : c ∈ C, q ≺ c
}
always has a unique
coupling such that any two of its elements satisfy Pmax. (Such a coupling is referred to as a
multimaximal coupling).
(P3) Tq =
{
T cq : c ∈ C, q ≺ c
}
is a multimaximal coupling ofRq if and only if, for any {c1, . . . , ck} ⊆
C, the probability of T c1q = . . . = T ckq is maximal among all couplings of
{
Rc1q , . . . , R
ck
q
}
.
(P4) If Rq =
{
Rc1q , . . . , R
cl
q
}
is enumerated so that Pr
[
Rc1q = 1
] ≤ . . . ≤ Pr [Rclq = 1] , then Tq is
a multimaximal coupling of Rq if and only if Pr
[
T ciq = T
ci+1
q
]
is maximal for i = 1, . . . , l − 1
among all possible couplings of Rq.
Especially important in quantum-mechanical applications are cyclic systems of ranks n = 2, 3, . . ..
Denoting by ⊕1 cyclic clockwise shift 1 7→ 2, . . . , n− 1 7→ n, n 7→ 1 (and by 	1 the opposite shift),
a cyclic system of rank n has conteXts c = 1, . . . , n, conteNts q = 1, . . . , n, and consists of dichoto-
mous (+1/−1) random variables {Rii, Rii⊕1 : i = 1, . . . , n}. Some examples of such systems are: for
n = 2, question order effects (Wang & Busemeyer, 2013; Wang, Solloway, Shiffrin, & Busemeyer,
2014); for n = 3, the Suppes-Zanotti (Suppes & Zanotti, 1981), original Bell (1964), and Leggett-
Garg (Leggett & Garg, 1985) systems in quantum mechanics, and simple decision making systems
in cognition (Asano, Hashimoto, Khrennikov, Ohya, & Tanaka, 2014; Basieva et al., in press);
6for n = 4, the EPR/Bohm-Bell-CHSH systems (Bell, 1966; Bohm & Aharonov, 1957; Clauser &
Horne, 1974; Clauser, Horne, Shimony, & Holt, 1969; Fine, 1982a, b), and decision making and
psychophysical systems (Bruza, Kitto, Nelson, & McEvoy, 2009; Bruza, Kitto, Ramm, & Sitbon,
2015; Cervantes & Dzhafarov, 2017, 2018); for n = 5, the KCBS system (Klyachko et al., 2008;
Lapkiewicz, Li, Schaeff, Langford, Ramelow, Wieśniak, & Zeilinger, 2011); for n > 5, some psy-
chophysical systems (Zhang & Dzhafarov, 2016). The main theoretical result here is
Theorem 1.1 (Kujala & Dzhafarov, 2016). A cyclic system of rank n is contextual if and only if
(denoting expected value by 〈·〉)
max
ι1,...,ιk∈{−1,1},
∏n
i=1 ιi=−1
n∑
i=1
ιi
〈
RiiR
i
i⊕1
〉− (n− 2)− n∑
i=1
∣∣〈Rii〉− 〈Ri	1i 〉∣∣ > 0. (9)
[] Prior to Kujala and Dzhafarov (2016), this general result was conjectured and proved for small
values of n (Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Larsson, 2015; Kujala & Dzhafarov, 2015). The special case of
this result for consistently connected systems had been proved, by very different means, in (Araújo
et al., 2013).
We do not have analogous closed-form criteria for non-cyclic systems, but the theory here is
well-developed. There is a general linear programming method for establishing contextuality or lack
thereof in any given system with finite sets C and Q and dichotomous random variables (Dzhafarov
& Kujala, 2016a; Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017) (in fact, the method would work for any
categorical random variables, but the CbD approach does not require this, see Section 1.3). The
problem is reduced to a certain underdetermined system of linear equations,
MQ = P. (10)
Here, P =
(
1, #1. . ., #2. . .
)
, where #1 denotes all probabilities characterizing the distributions within the
conteXts (e.g., Pr
[
R11 = 1, R
1
2 = 1, R
1
3 = −1
]
), and #2 denotes all probabilities characterizing the
maximal couplings
{
T cq , T
c′
q
}
of the separate conteNt-sharing pairs (e.g., Pr
[
T 12 = 1, T
2
2 = 1
]
); Q is
a vector of probabilities (summing to 1) for all possible values of the hypothetical coupling S; andM
is a Boolean matrix with 1’s in each row corresponding to values of S comprising the events whose
probabilities are given in P. The system is noncontextual if and only if these linear equations have
a solution for Q with nonnegative components. The linear programming representation of CbD
naturally leads to its geometric representations by polytopes and graph-theoretic renderings. A
detailed version of the latter was recently proposed by Amaral, Duarte, and Oliveira (2018).
1.3 Arbitrary random variables
The current version of CbD (Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2017a,
b) posits that all random variables in a system should be dichotomized before they are submitted
to contextuality analysis. One reason for this is that the property P2 in the previous section does
not hold for non-dichotomous variables: a multimaximal coupling need not exist, and when it does,
need not be unique. The other reason is that one expects a noncontextual systems to remain
noncontextual if some values of a random variable are “lumped together” (e.g., if in {1, 2, 3, 4} one
ceases to distinguish 1 and 2) (Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017). Dichotomizations are easy
7if in the initial description of an empirical domain all random variables are categorical (i.e., have
unordered finite sets of values). One then is interested in all possible dichotomizations: an n-valued
random variable is replaced with 2n−1−1 distinct dichotomizations (with unordered pairs of values).
For instance, if an initial R has values {1, 2, 3, 4}, in contextual analysis it is replaced with 7 jointly
distributed
R(1) R(2) R(3) R(4) R(5) R(6) R(7)
values: 1 ‖ 2, 3, 4 2 ‖ 1, 3, 4 3 ‖ 1, 2, 4 4 ‖ 1, 2, 3 1, 2 ‖ 3, 4 1, 3 ‖ 2, 4 1, 4 ‖ 2, 3 (11)
Assume, e.g., that in system E of (1) the variables for q = 1 have 4 values, variables for q = 3 have
3 values, and the other two variables are binary. Dichotomization of the system then transforms it
into
R11(1) R
1
1(2) R
1
1(3) R
1
1(4) R
1
1(5) R
1
1(6) R
1
1(7) R
1
2 R
1
4 c = 1
R22 R
2
3(1) R
2
3(2) R
2
3(3) c = 2
R31(1) R
3
1(2) R
3
1(3) R
3
1(4) R
3
1(5) R
3
1(6) R
3
1(7) R
3
2 R
3
3(1) R
3
3(2) R
3
3(3) c = 3
q = 1(1) 1(2) 1(3) 1(4) 1(5) 1(6) 1(7) 2 3(1) 3(2) 3(3) 4 system E∗
(12)
where the numbers in parentheses encode different dichotomizations. The procedure effectively
splits old conteNts into new conteNts. The size of the system increases only in visual appearance,
because in each row of E∗ the support of the joint distribution is precisely the same as in system E .
The original system is considered contextual if its dichotomization is contextual. The main result
here is
Theorem (Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017). A system of categorical random variables (be-
fore dichotomization) is contextual if, for some (q, c, c′), neither of Rcq, Rc
′
q nominally dominates the
other.
It is this theorem that we use to analyze the experiment below. The meaning of nominal
dominance is as follows: given A and B with the same set of values {1, . . . , k}, A nominally
dominates B if the inequality Pr [A = i] < Pr [B = i] holds for no more than one value of i = 1, . . . , k
(i.e., if Pr [A = i] ≥ Pr [B = i] for at least k − 1 of them). Thus, among the pairs of probability
distributions below,
(i) Values 1 2 3 4 5
probabilities for A: 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0
probabilities for B: 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0
,
(ii) 1 2 3 4 5
probabilities for A: 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0
probabilities for B: 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0
,
(iii) Values 1 2 3 4 5
probabilities for A: 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0
probabilities for B: 0.5 0 0.1 0.4 0
,
(iv) Values 1 2 3 4 5
probabilities for A: 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0
probabilities for B: 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1
,
(13)
in (i) and (ii) A and B nominally dominate each other, in (iii) A nominally dominates B, and in
(iv) neither of the two random variables nominally dominates the other.
The theorem above tells us that if we are interested in all possible dichotomizations, we may
not need to actually create them to determine that the system is contextual. It suffices instead
to find at least one instance when neither of two original (as observed, before dichotomization)
8Figure 1: Layout of the keyboard with the response keys stickers for left and right stimuli.
conteNt-sharing random variables nominally dominates the other, as in (iv) above. The condition
is only sufficient but not necessary for contextuality: if nominal dominance is found in all pairs of
conteNt-sharing random variables, the system may or may not be contextual.
2 Double-Identification Experiment
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Three volunteers, graduate students at Purdue University, one female and two males (including the
first author of this paper), with normal or corrected to normal vision, participated in this study.
The experimental program was regulated by Purdue University’s IRB protocol #1202011876. The
participants are identified as P1, P2, and P3 in the text below.
2.1.2 Equipment
A personal computer was used with an Intel® Core™ processor running Windows XP, and with a
24-in. monitor with a resolution of 1920× 1200 pixels (px). The participant’s head was steadied in
a chin-rest with forehead support at 90 cm distance from the monitor; at this distance a pixel on
the screen subtended 62 sec arc. The response keys on a US 104-key keyboard were indicated by
stickers with the corresponding response labels (see Figure 1).
2.1.3 Stimuli
The stimuli presented on the computer screen consisted of two brightly grey colored circles (RGB
100-100-100) on a black background, with their centers 320 px apart horizontally, each circle having
the radius of 135 px and 4 px wide circumference. Each circle contained within it a dot of 4 px in
diameter, that could be located in the circle’s center or 4 px away from it, in the left, right, upward
or downward direction. An example of the stimuli is shown in Figure 2.
2.1.4 Procedure
In each trial the participant was asked to indicate, for each circle, whether the dot was in its center
or shifted in one of the four directions (up, down, left, or right). The responses were given by
pressing in any order and holding together two designated keys, one for each location in each circle,
9Figure 2: An example of the stimuli in experiment (in reversed contrast and not to scale). In the
left circle the dot is in the center, in the right one it is shifted to the right by 4 px (' 4.1min arc).
The participant’s task was to identify the location of the dot in each of the two circles by pressing
corresponding keys on a keyboard.
as shown in Fig. 2. The stimuli were displayed until both keys were pressed. Then, the dots in each
circle disappeared, and the next pair of dots appeared 600 ms later. The circles, with or without the
dots, remained displayed continuously throughout the experiment. (Response times were recorded
but not used in the data analysis.)
Each participant completed between 20 and 23 experimental sessions, each lasting 30 minutes
and consisting of about 380 trials recorded and used for subsequent analysis. The experimental
sessions were preceded by two training sessions, excluded from the analysis. The first 75 trials of each
training session were practice trials in which the participants received feedback as to whether their
response for each of the two circles was correct or not. No feedback was given in the experimental
trials.
2.2 Experimental conteXts and conteNts
In each of two circles the dot presented could be in one of 5 locations: at the center, or shifted
to the left, right, up, or down. These locations formed conteNts of the random variables in the
probabilistic description of the experiment, denoted as shown in Table 1. The same table shows
that the 5× 5 pairs of locations of the two dots formed 25 conteXts. In each experimental session,
all conteXts were presented [close-to-]equal numbers of times (about 15).
For each session, each trial was randomly assigned to one of the conditions in Figure 1. The
number of experimental sessions was chosen so that the expected number of experimental trials in
each of the conteXts was at least 300. This number of observations was chosen based on Cepeda
Cuervo, Aguilar, Cervantes, Corrales, Díaz, and Rodríguez (2008), whose results show that coverage
errors with respect to nominal values are below 1% for most confidence intervals for proportions
with n > 300.
The system of random variables describing the experiment is shown in Figure 3.
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Table 1: Notation used for the conteXts and the conteNts: c, l, r, u, and d denote that the dot is,
respectively, in the center, shifted to the left, to the right, up, or down. The 25 conteXts are denoted
cc, cu, du, etc., the left (right) symbol indicating the location of the dot in the left (respectively,
right) circle. To denote conteNts, the location of a dot is shown on the left (for the left circle) or
on the right (for the right circle) of a dash: thus, c- denotes the dot in the center of the left circle,
-l denotes the dot shifted to the left in the right circle, etc.
Right circle conteNts
(-c) (-l) (-r) (-u) (-d)
Left circle conteNts
Center (c-) cc cl cr cu cd
Left (l-) lc ll lr lu ld
Right (r-) rc rl rr ru rd
Up (u-) uc ul ur uu ud
Down (d-) dc dl dr du dd
c- -c l- -l r- -r u- -u d- -d
cc ? ?
cl ? ?
cr ? ?
cu ? ?
cd ? ?
lc ? ?
ll ? ?
lr ? ?
lu ? ?
ld ? ?
rc ? ?
rl ? ?
rr ? ?
ru ? ?
rd ? ?
uc ? ?
ul ? ?
ur ? ?
uu ? ?
ud ? ?
dc ? ?
dl ? ?
dr ? ?
du ? ?
dd ? ?
Figure 3: The conteNt-conteXt system of measurements for the double detection experiment. The
cell corresponding to conteXt xy and conteNt z (with z being x- or -y), if it contains a star,
represents the random variable Rxyz ; the absence of a star means that conteNt z was not measured
in conteXt xy. For instance, xy = cc and z = c- define a random variable Rccc- . There are two
random jointly distributed variables, Rxyx- and Rxy-y , in each conteXt xy, and their joint distribution
is defined by the probabilities: Pr
[
Rxyx- = j, R
xy
-y = k
]
where j, k ∈{center, left, right, up, down}.
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Table 2: Bootstrap estimates of the probabilities for the systems to satisfy the nominal dominance
condition.
ConteNt P1 P2 P3
c- 0.038 0.000 0.000
l- 0.000 0.000 0.224
r- 0.000 0.000 0.003
u- 0.429 0.000 0.023
d- 0.002 0.000 0.001
-c 0.412 0.000 0.000
-l 0.019 0.000 0.385
-r 0.000 0.000 0.015
-u 0.566 0.001 0.034
-d 0.001 0.000 0.000
Overall,
for all contents 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.3 Results
The complete set of results obtained in the experiment (excluding training sessions) is stored
in "Contextuality in a psychophysical double-identification experiment", https://doi.org/10.7910/
DVN/FCT9VO. The data used in the analysis of the nominal dominance condition are shown in
Tables A1, A2, and A3, placed in Appendix. These tables show the estimated probabilities with
which each of the three participants responded in each of five possible ways (center, left, right,
up, and down) to the left stimulus and to the right stimulus, in each of the 25 conteXts. For all
participants, the nominal dominance condition fails for at least one pair of random variables for
each of the conteNts. This means that, for all three participants, the pattern of the results indicates
contextuality.
To assess the reliability of these results, we generated 100000 bootstrap resamples for each
participant: each bootstrap resample was generated by independently selecting, with replacement,
a random sample from (and of the same size as) the responses given in the experiment to each of
the two circles in each conteXt. The proportions of resamples in which nominal dominance was
observed are presented in Table 2, for each conteNt separately, and (in the bottom row of the
table) for all conteNts simultaneously. Note that it is the latter that matters for our analysis: the
system may be noncontextual only if nominal dominance is satisfied for all pairs of conteNt-sharing
random variables. This was observed for none of the resamples and none of the participants. We
can model this situation, for each participant, as a sequence of 100000 binomial trials with zero
successes. If p denotes the probability of this happening (let us label this as a “success”), We can
model the results, for each participant, as a Bernoulli sequence of length 100000, with probability
of a “success” (overall compliance with nominal dominance) being p, and the observed number of
successes being zero. The exact 99.999% Clopper-Pearson (Clopper & Pearson, 1934) confidence
interval for p is [0, 0.00012]. We can clearly dismiss the possibility that our data result from random
perturbations of a pattern that satisfies nominal dominance.
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3 Discussion
Based on the CbD analysis of many published experiments in none of which contextuality was
found, it was tempting to hypothesize that all behavioral systems were noncontextual (Dzhafarov,
Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, & Jones, 2016; Dzhafarov, Zhang, & Kujala, 2015; Zhang & Dzhafarov,
2016). This hypothesis was rejected by recent crowdsourcing experiments (Basieva et al., in press;
Cervantes & Dzhafarov, 2018), but the question remained open as to whether contextuality can
also be observed in individual human behavior. In the crowdsourcing experiments the stimuli were
questions to be answered in one of two ways. In such an experiment a repeated presentation of a
question to the same person cannot be viewed as a repeated recording of the same random variable,
because the person would most likely remember her previous answers and repeat them not to
contradict herself, or would deliberately vary them due to the phenomenon of satiation. Therefore,
to investigate contextuality in a within-subject paradigm, one has to use stimuli that do not have
any distinguishing characteristics by which they can be remembered. Thus, if a variety of weak
flashes varying in intensity are judged in terms of “I have seen it” or “I have not seen it,” there is
no way the observer may remember seeing a particular flash before, unless this flash was seen with
probability 1. Analogously, in our experiment, there was no way a participant could remember
seeing a specific dot position in one of the circles, as no position was identified perfectly.
A previously conducted experiment (Cervantes & Dzhafarov, 2017a, b), similar to the one pre-
sented in this paper, revealed no contextuality, i.e., all conteXt-dependence in it could be attributed
to direct influences. In that experiment the dots within two circles could vary on three levels (cen-
ter, up, down) and the responses were dichotomous: “in the center” or “not in the center.” As it
turns out, switching to questions with five possible answers (and increasing the number of conteNts
to five to match them) changed the system from noncontextual to contextual.
The overall conteXt-dependence in our experiment means that a given location q of the dot in a
circle is judged differently for different locations q′ of the dot in the other circle. This direct influence
of q′ on responses to q manifests itself in the changing distribution of the responses to q as q′ changes.
The contextuality of the system, however, shows that these direct influences cannot account for the
entire situation: the changes in the identity of the random variable representing the responses to q
in different conteXts are greater than warranted by their distributional differences. This is another
way of stating the definition of a contextual system, according to which the joint distributions of the
random variables within conteXts force conteNt-sharing random variables (responses to the same
q at different q′) to be more dissimilar than warranted by the difference in their distributions.
The relationship between the two forms of conteXt-dependence in a contextual system, direct
influences and contextuality proper, is a complex issue of which we have very little knowledge
at present. A remarkable fact is that this relationship seems to be different in systems of binary
random variables (at least in cyclic systems, mentioned in Section 1.2) and in systems of multivalued
random variables. As is evident from (9), the direct influences and contextuality in a cyclic system
are antagonistic. Direct influences in (9) are represented by
n∑
i=1
∣∣〈Rii〉− 〈Ri	1i 〉∣∣ , (14)
and as this quantity increases, the value of the left-hand-side expression in (9) decreases, making
the system less likely to be contextual. In our present experiment the situation is more complex.
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Direct influences here are responsible for the differences between the distributions
responses to q in context qq′: center left right up down
probabilities: p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
and
responses to q in context qq′′: center left right up down
probabilities: p′1 p′2 p′3 p′4 p′5
.
In the absence of all direct influences, i.e., with pi = p′i for all i, the nominal dominance is trivially
satisfied. This does not mean that the system in noncontextual, but its contextuality will have
to be established by other means, generally, by solving the linear programming task (10). Direct
influences must be present to break the nominal dominance relation and thereby allow us to establish
contextuality “easily.” More work is needed to understand this relationship better.
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Appendix: Data tables
Table A1: Empirical estimates of marginal distributions for the conteNt-conteXt system in Fig. 3
for participant P1.
P1 Left response Right response
Context Trials Center Left Right Up Down Center Left Right Up Down
cc 336 .318 .521 .000 .155 .006 .235 .455 .000 .310 .000
cl 334 .213 .656 .000 .132 .000 .015 .871 .000 .108 .006
cr 336 .390 .435 .000 .155 .021 .601 .060 .018 .318 .003
cu 336 .298 .554 .000 .143 .006 .021 .149 .000 .830 .000
cd 336 .265 .574 .000 .152 .009 .271 .613 .000 .030 .086
lc 334 .036 .931 .000 .027 .006 .195 .527 .000 .278 .000
ll 335 .024 .928 .000 .042 .006 .021 .860 .000 .119 .000
lr 335 .051 .913 .003 .030 .003 .558 .122 .018 .299 .003
lu 335 .054 .904 .000 .033 .009 .042 .176 .003 .779 .000
ld 334 .042 .910 .003 .042 .003 .314 .605 .000 .024 .057
rc 333 .763 .081 .033 .117 .006 .246 .483 .000 .270 .000
rl 334 .605 .159 .051 .183 .003 .018 .859 .000 .120 .003
rr 335 .782 .048 .024 .137 .009 .591 .042 .021 .346 .000
ru 336 .685 .077 .027 .202 .009 .045 .083 .000 .872 .000
rd 335 .701 .075 .036 .179 .009 .322 .555 .000 .033 .090
uc 335 .116 .269 .003 .612 .000 .200 .457 .000 .343 .000
ul 336 .062 .345 .000 .592 .000 .021 .872 .003 .101 .003
ur 334 .156 .216 .000 .629 .000 .581 .051 .027 .335 .006
uu 334 .084 .260 .000 .656 .000 .033 .108 .000 .859 .000
ud 335 .096 .191 .000 .713 .000 .343 .558 .000 .033 .066
dc 335 .337 .478 .000 .006 .179 .242 .460 .000 .296 .003
dl 334 .237 .599 .000 .006 .159 .012 .880 .000 .108 .000
dr 336 .312 .449 .000 .009 .229 .589 .054 .027 .330 .000
du 335 .310 .504 .000 .015 .170 .030 .116 .000 .854 .000
dd 335 .346 .451 .000 .006 .197 .370 .549 .000 .012 .069
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Table A2. Empirical estimates of marginal distributions for the conteNt-conteXt system in Fig.
3 for participant P2.
P2 Left response Right response
Context Trials Center Left Right Up Down Center Left Right Up Down
cc 336 .616 .062 .039 .226 .057 .560 .062 .164 .202 .012
cl 336 .586 .080 .033 .268 .033 .265 .604 .015 .107 .009
cr 336 .586 .045 .062 .259 .048 .185 .000 .720 .071 .024
cu 336 .607 .083 .033 .220 .057 .131 .062 .089 .717 .000
cd 336 .580 .054 .024 .304 .039 .348 .033 .086 .024 .509
lc 336 .223 .604 .000 .134 .039 .610 .092 .119 .152 .027
ll 336 .214 .583 .003 .164 .036 .274 .548 .021 .134 .024
lr 336 .223 .586 .009 .158 .024 .220 .006 .682 .065 .027
lu 336 .310 .527 .000 .128 .036 .149 .042 .089 .720 .000
ld 336 .226 .557 .003 .179 .036 .333 .039 .098 .021 .509
rc 336 .339 .003 .443 .176 .039 .548 .086 .158 .173 .036
rl 336 .318 .012 .432 .205 .033 .247 .631 .018 .080 .024
rr 336 .310 .003 .429 .229 .030 .140 .018 .696 .116 .030
ru 336 .336 .000 .467 .158 .039 .170 .033 .074 .720 .003
rd 336 .351 .000 .405 .211 .033 .381 .054 .095 .030 .440
uc 336 .146 .018 .015 .818 .003 .646 .048 .134 .137 .036
ul 336 .131 .030 .015 .821 .003 .345 .545 .012 .068 .030
ur 336 .146 .030 .006 .815 .003 .235 .000 .688 .057 .021
uu 336 .167 .021 .018 .795 .000 .196 .036 .128 .637 .003
ud 336 .137 .015 .009 .836 .003 .390 .024 .068 .015 .503
dc 336 .354 .030 .036 .021 .560 .539 .057 .143 .229 .033
dl 336 .366 .039 .024 .018 .554 .220 .583 .006 .158 .033
dr 336 .375 .039 .006 .009 .571 .199 .003 .661 .119 .018
du 336 .393 .018 .033 .021 .536 .122 .027 .065 .786 .000
dd 336 .360 .039 .024 .036 .542 .393 .048 .116 .021 .423
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Table A3. Empirical estimates of marginal distributions for the conteNt-conteXt system in Fig.
3 for participant P3.
P3 Left response Right response
Context Trials Center Left Right Up Down Center Left Right Up Down
cc 336 .738 .092 .012 .143 .015 .634 .149 .015 .188 .015
cl 337 .801 .053 .030 .110 .006 .027 .955 .000 .018 .000
cr 336 .762 .098 .021 .107 .012 .321 .003 .631 .036 .009
cu 336 .768 .086 .033 .098 .015 .128 .060 .000 .812 .000
cd 335 .785 .081 .021 .101 .012 .648 .081 .009 .003 .260
lc 337 .056 .935 .000 .009 .000 .700 .104 .039 .151 .006
ll 336 .060 .929 .000 .012 .000 .045 .929 .000 .027 .000
lr 337 .053 .929 .000 .015 .003 .288 .000 .680 .033 .000
lu 337 .059 .917 .000 .021 .003 .148 .059 .006 .786 .000
ld 336 .051 .938 .000 .012 .000 .676 .054 .015 .006 .250
rc 336 .336 .000 .649 .012 .003 .658 .125 .024 .185 .009
rl 337 .335 .009 .635 .021 .000 .027 .935 .000 .039 .000
rr 336 .312 .000 .670 .012 .006 .298 .000 .667 .036 .000
ru 337 .332 .000 .653 .015 .000 .142 .071 .000 .783 .003
rd 336 .280 .000 .699 .015 .006 .658 .074 .021 .012 .235
uc 336 .164 .033 .003 .801 .000 .699 .134 .021 .137 .009
ul 336 .143 .065 .003 .789 .000 .042 .943 .000 .012 .003
ur 336 .134 .033 .003 .830 .000 .327 .000 .631 .033 .009
uu 336 .202 .033 .003 .762 .000 .164 .062 .000 .774 .000
ud 337 .172 .021 .003 .804 .000 .668 .080 .015 .000 .237
dc 335 .603 .021 .012 .000 .364 .618 .137 .009 .230 .006
dl 337 .626 .030 .027 .000 .318 .030 .950 .000 .021 .000
dr 337 .644 .030 .021 .000 .306 .329 .000 .635 .033 .003
du 337 .638 .030 .015 .000 .318 .151 .080 .003 .766 .000
dd 336 .619 .039 .012 .003 .327 .708 .068 .009 .006 .208
